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Many studies have been made so far of the intellectual activity of 
animals and children. ""1<As representative researches about children may be 
cited, among the rest, Lipmann and Bogen's "Naive Physik" and Got-
tschaldt's "Der Aufbau des kindlichen Handelns". 
Lipmann tentatively defines that intelligence is the capacities for 
grasping given contents so as to adjust to the fact and for handling them 
so as to adjust to the purpose. These two functions are performed as 
"Gestaltungsvorgang zum lnhalt". But the former, namely, intellectual cogni-
tion (das intelligente Erkennen), the self-aim of which is cognition, consists 
chiefly in the grasping of the logical, abstract, sensory characteristics and 
relations of the objects, while the latter, namely, intellectual activity (das 
intelligente Handeln) contains activity as an indispensable prerequisite. 
Accordingly, cognition in this case presents the objects as cues, means or 
goals of the handling; it is the grasping of the causal relation of things 
which are to govern the results of activity. Therfore, this cognition is 
-restricted to the "naive Physik". 
The validity of this theory of Lipmann's-that intellectual cognition 
and intellectual activity are totally different functions-was proved by 
Bogen's detour-experiment in which no great differece was found in the 
results of intellectual activity between normal children superior in intellec-
tual cognition as measured by common intelligence test and feeble-minded 
children (morons and imbeciles) inferior in the same function. 
The problem given them was to take a ball out of a box with any of 
five kinds of tools. 
A question may natually be raised: "Have these two functions nothing 
to do with each other in any situation as in this case?" The answer is in 
the affirmative. 
For in Gottschaldt's Experiments XV and XVI, for instance, a remar-
kable difference in results is seen between normal and feebl-minded children 
(morons, imbeciles and idiots). 
* A part of the materials of this study is based on my graduation thesis (1952) written 
under the guidance of Professor Y. Ohwaki. 
** For the general introduction and criticism of studies on the intel!ectuale activity, see 
Refernces 2, II, 13, and 14. 
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The experimental apparatus was a situation in which two boxes were 
placed 20cm apart on the floor, with the goal-object placed on the box at 
the farther end. The children standing outside the bars were required to 
let fall the goal-object on the floor from either the right or left side, 
seeing to it that it should not fall between the two-boxes, and then to pull 
it toward themselves. None of the children could solve the problem from 
the flrst, but the normal children showed much better results than the feeble-
minded in solution by insight after trials and help (einsichtige Losung nach 
Probieren und Helfen). 
It is certain that in the developmental process of intelligence there is 
an important boundary between intellectual cognition or logical intelligence 
(die logische Intelligenz) and intellectual activity or practical intelligence 
(die praktische Intelligenz) as well as between instinctive reaction and 
intellectual activity. Further, the difference between Bogen's and Gottsch-
aldt's results suggests that, in some cases, intellectual cognition and 
intellectual activity may, on account of the problem-situation, have noth-
ing to do with each other while, in others, the former may affect the latter 
positively and functionally. 
One may ask what was the fundamental difference of the problem-
situations of the two investigators. As a cue to solve this problem, a 
highly suggestive explanation is given in Gottschaldt's theoretical inquiry 
into the reasons why the normal children (3 or 4 years of age) had greater 
difficulty in his Experiments XV and XVI than in Kohler's detour-board 
(Umwegbrett) test applied to them. 
He says: 
"Verwendet man wie Kohler ein sog. Rahmenbrett, so wird dem 
Pri.ifling eine grosse Hilfe gegeben, weil durch die Seitenkanten des Brettes 
die Bewegungsmoglichkeiten des Ziels schon physikalish sehr eingeengt sind. 
Bei der Kistenanordnug ist das nicht der Fall, sondern physikalisch sind 
alle vier Kanten der obern Kistenflache gleichwertig, funktional aber kom-
men nur die beiden seitlichen Kanten in Frage. Die Leistung des Kindes 
besteht darin, dass es den Funktionscharakter dieser seitlichen Kanten 
erfasst, d. h. dass es voraussieht. welche Ortslagen der Zielgegenstand 
einnehmen wird, wenn er iiber eine der Kanten geschoben ist. Der Ablauf 
des Geschehens muss also im ganzen antizipiert werden, schon bevor das 
Kind zu handeln beginnt, weil jedes probeweise Verschieben des Ziels 
Fehler zur Folge haben kann, die in dem gleichen Versuchsverlauf nicht 
verbessert werden konnen. (Das Ziel kann z. B. in den Raum zwischen 
beiden Kisten fallen.) "(3, 208)--" Der Aufbau der Anordnung ist sehr viel 
eindeutiger, weil die Seitenwande nicht nur physikalische Begrenzungen 
sind, sondern auch psychologischesteuernd wirken. Das Ziel kann zwar 
direkt herangezogen werden, aber sehr bald stosst es auf die Seitenwande 
des Kastens, die weiter ,,fehlerhafte" Bewegungen ausschliessen. Fast alle 
gesunden Kinder vom 3. Lebensjahr an erweisen sich daher auch fahig, 
beim Umwegbrettversuch das Ziel zu erreichen." (3,215). 
The effect of the barrier on the difficulty of detour-behavior was also 
tested by the author's preliminary experiment. The procedure of that 
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experiment was as follows : 
Ten imbeciles (C. A.10;1-16;0, M.A. 3;4-6;8) served as subjects in Problem 
A and B. The situation of Problem A is shown in Fig. 1. The experi-
menter can open or shut as occation arises the doors of exits A, B, C and 
0 
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D in the K-shaped detour-board. The 
figures 1, 2 and 3 indicate the turning 
points. Six path units from one 
turning point to another turning point 
or an exit were 10. 5cm long and 3cm 
wide. The height of the side-walls 
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and four doors (barriers) was 2cm. Subjects were told to push away the 
goal-object (jelly) in the direction of 180 degrees and take it out from exit 
A by a stick. Problem B is shown in Fig. 2. There were three holes (a, b, c) 
surrourding turning point 1 and white paper was placed on them as the lid 
in the training situation. Subjects were required to solve the detour (180° 
or 135°)-problem in the test situation in which hole a or b was stopped by a 
black board after experiencing that they could not take out the goal-object 
from any exit on account of the holes during three training trials. We 
made our subjects repeat the test three times for both Problem A and B. 
The principal results were as follows : 
All subjects solved purposively Problem A from the first, while in 
Problem B six of our children failed even in the third attempt. From 
these results, as Gottschaldt says, it may be admitted that, other condi-
tions being equal, detour-activity becomes very difficult in a situation 
which contains no barrier with physical and psychological interception 
-effect. 
As a theoretical consequence of Gottschaldt it is probable that 
Bogen's experimental situation of detour-box, in which children were 
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told to make detour simply by rolling, scooping up or g1vmg a jumping 
motion to the ball, has essentially much the same character as Kohler's 
detour-board; hence no great difference in the results between normal and 
feeble-minded children. Accordingly, suppose there is a problem-situation 
which includes both "Section A" having the same character as Bogen's 
situation, and "Section B" having the same character as Gottschaldt's 
situation in which the cognition before handling the physical structure 
inevitably determines the success or failure of the activity. 
In 11Section A" there will be seen no difference in results between child-
ren with superior and those with inferior intellectual cognition faculty. In 
"Section B", on the contrary, it may be expected that the former will 
adjust better, consequently show better result in solving the whole problem 
situation. 
The present experiment is intended to examine such relations between 
intellectual cognition and intellectual activity, and also to inquire into the 
dynamic process of solution by insight. 
METHODS 
Subjects: 
The subjects used in the principal experiment were 10 superior child-
ren (C. A.11: 9-12; 6, I. Q. 119-136) and 10 inferior children (C. A.11 ; 7--12; 5, 
I. Q. 72-98) belonging to the 6th grade of the primary school. Both groups 
consisted of 5 boys and 5 girls. In a supplementary experiment were 
used 10 feeble-minded children (morons and imbeciles, C. A.10; 2-14; 3, 
I. Q. 41-66). * 
Apparatus: 
The present experimental apparatus consists of a detour-box (Fig. 3) 
and five kinds of tools (Fig. 4) with which to take out the ball from the box. 
The detour-box (33.5x29.5x17.5cm) has in its front nine perpendicular 
bars standing in a row at a distance of 2. 5cm. The interior is divided 
by three rails into Section I and Section II, both of which are so construc-
ted that the floor slants downward toward the front by raising the back-
bottom 1. 5cm. The ball (3. 8cm in diameter) is placed at (a) in Section I. 
Section II is connected with Section III through an obstacle (d) 4cm high. 
Section III (a square scantling 4x4x41cm) makes an upward slope left-
wardly from (e) to (f) which is 7. 5cm high. The wall at the end (g) is 
coverd with cloth so as to prevent the ball from bouncing as much as 
possible. The part (h) with (a) downward slant toward the front, faces 
the hole (i) in Section IV. The bottom of this hole (5x5x6cm) forms a 
downward slope to the right, so that the ball, when it falls into the hole, 
may return to its original place (a). 
* The I. Q. of normal children was taken from re Scale Intelligence Test (Kokumin 
Chino Kensa A). Further reference was made to the results of f3 Scale Intelligence 
Test (Tanaka B). The I. Q. of feeble-minded children was taken from Binet-Simon 
Intelligence Test (Revised by Suzuki). 
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Four kinds of tools S, T, R and C are all 33cm long. S with a square 
board and a check-board at its end is shaped like a spoon. T has a 3cm 
long bar at its end. R is an ordinary stick, while C is a chop-stick with 
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Fig. 3 Detour -Box 
both ends pointed. The tool B is 
a b ciard to be used for covering 
the hole (i) in Section IV so as to 
pass the ball. This, of course, 
can be done by tool S also. 
Even if the ball has been 
skilfully moved up to Section III, 
the problem cannot be solved at 
all unless the hole is coverd, 
because the ball will fall into the 
hole. It can be said, therefore, 
that Section IV, unlike Section I--
s r R c 8 I II, has such a nature that the 
Fig . 4. Tools corr ection of errors is not per-
missible in one and the same trial and the preliminary cognition before 
handling of the physical strucuture of the problem-situation inevitably 
determines the success or failure of the activity. Thus, without the hole, 
our apparatus would not differ essentially from Bogen's. 
Procedure : 
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All children were required to try three times in succession, each success 
or failure counted as one trial. Hence, three successive failures were cosider-
ed as non-solution. When a subject took more than a quarter of an hour 
before the manipulation, some help was given to enable him to find thd 
detour-path; further, if a subject could not pass the ball through Section 
III whithin a quarter of an hour after help or manipulation without 
help, it was considered as failure. 
The instruction given was as follows : 
"You see a ball (pointing to itJ in there, and some tools down there 
(arranged as shown in Fig.4 on the right side of the box). Take out the 
ball as you please with those tools". And to the child who could not flnd 
the detour-path within the fixed time was given a help in words ; for 
instance: "You see a slope rising from there (pointing to(e)) up to there 
(f). what is that path for?" If any child rolled the ball from (a)in Section 
I ditectly to the hole (i), trying to scoop it up from there, he was told not 
to do so. 
The types of solution by insight were observed from the points of view 
generally accepted by many past investigations, such as "survey of total 
situation", "appearance of critical point", "fluent process of solution'', etc. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
]. Discovery of detour-Path 
It was not so difficult for both superior and inferior children to grasp 
the visual structure of the detour-situation ; all the children discovered 
sooner or later, as it may be self-evident, the route connecting Sections 
I, II, III, and IV, that is, the detour-path. It follows, therefore, that 
for both groups of children the difficulty of problem-situation consists in 
that of grasping the physical structure of the detour-path. 
Now, for the feeble-minded children the discovery of the detour-path 
was relatively difficult; 4 of them spent some time in trying to pull the 
ball directly to his side and rolling it between Section I and Section II to 
no purpose. That such manipulation of tools towards themselves in the 
feeble-minded is, in the process of thinking, a"Ground" against detour-
behavior on one hand, but that it has, on the other hand, a character of 
"Figure" against an uneffectual reaction of lower dimension, is proved by 
the activity of an idiot (C. A. 17; 4, M.A. 2; 6, I. Q. 14) used for compari-
son. 
The series of activities of this child in his first trial may be shown 
with signs as follows; 
I(LH,.J,-R,.J,-Ct-)-II (C,.J,-R,.J,-B,.J,-C,.J,-B,.J,-C,.J,-S • C,.J,-C,.J,LH,.J,-Bt-)-
I (LH,.J,-C,.J,-RH,.J,-C,.J,-R,.J,-RH,.J,C,.J,-Ct-)- II (B,.J,-R,.J,-Fifteen mi-
nutes being passed, a help was given-St--Rt--S•Rt )-III (S(;-)-
30 minutes passed - II (St-) - III (S(;-) - IV (As the hole was not 
stopped, the ball returned to its original place), (Two more trials also 
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failed).* 
As is evident from the above, this child tried first to pick out the 
ball with his left hand through the bars many times : when he saw that 
it was in vain he then tried to pull it to himself with any tool his hand 
happened to touch upon. Even after he got accustomed to the use of the 
tools, a minute coordinate action was seen of trying to put his hand into 
the box, and further, even after he began to make a detour. such actions 
momentarily appeared as throwing away his tool and thrusting his hand 
into the box in a great hurry when the ball fell down from the tool to 
the bars in front, and picking up the tool again. This is a phenomenon 
which is called by Kohler "turning-round" (Umschlag) (5, 168-169, 184-185), 
it may mean that the detour as a "Figure" and the structure of habitual 
reaction as a "Ground" were yet unstable and that the relief of the '' Figure" 
and "Ground" made a sudden change at the moment of the "increase in 
strength of the valence (Aufforderungscharakter) of the goal object owing 
to its approach". Further, in case of this child, it so happened that. 
when he succeeded in putting the ball on (e) after some difficulty, he 
rejoiced so much as if he had finished the whole problem that he at once 
took out the stick, letting the ball roll back again to (b). 
The fact that such actions as "reaching out a hand", "using the tools in 
the direction of oneself", "discovery of a detour-path and detour-behavior", 
etc. may appear and disappear at any moment clearly shows the process 
of dynamic change of the "relief of accent" (Betontheitsrelief) of the total 
field. The relationship between the degree of development of the logical 
intlligence and the difficulty of detour-behavior may mean the same thing 
as what Kohler calls "Umwegkurven in verschiedenen Grade" 15,174) and 
what Maier (9) calls the effect of the habitual direction on a new direc-
tion.** Now I turn to the question what process of activity was taken by 
the superior and inferior children in Section I-II-III. 
2. The use of tools in Section I, II, and Ill. 
The superior and inferior children's use of tools in Sections I-III is 
shown in Table I. 
On the whole, the tendency to use two kinds of tools in combination 
was greater in the superior children than in the inferior children. This was 
especially so in Section II where the children were required to grasp 
fairly complicated relations between the slope, the rolling of the ball, the 
shape of the tool, and the existace of an obstacle. Thus it is known that 
superior children made better selection of tools (the average number of 
tools used in combination in Section II is as follows: Superior children, 
1. 30 and inferior children 0. 20; the difference is significant at the 5 % level 
of confidence by t-test). 
* Sections are shown by I, II, III, IV: Tools by S, R, C, etc. ; Direction of the hand or 
tool used is shown by an arrow -1, (for nistance, means the direction towards the 
subject); LH means the left hand, RH means the right hand. 
** Hull, C. L. (1938) and Lewin, K. (1946) tried to explain this ''effect of the starting 
angle•· from their respective standpoint. 
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But to turn to each tool, tool S, which seems most effective through 
the three sections, was made use of most frequently either separately or 
in combination by the majority of children of both groups (superior child-
TABLE 1 
The figures in this table show the number of times; e.g., Subject No. 1 
used both tool T and R at the same time once, and R alone twice in Section I. 
Section I II III 
Method Combina- Single Combina- Single Combina- Single of use tion tion tion 
~ Tool : 1: I =1~ SITIRIC B s s./: R SITIRIC :f:f: 6 sit cl" ~ ~RC RC . . R CR C RCR >c No. 
I I 2 2 I 2 1 
2 3 3 2 I 
U) 3 2 I I 1 I 2 I 
~ 4 3 3 3 
'C 5 3 3 3 ,,, 
... 6 l 2 3 3 s· 
... 7 2 l 3 3 
£ 8 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 s: IO I I I 2 I 1 1 1 ... 
(I) 
J:I 
Total] 4131113115/ 1 / 2J I 1 51312/ 3/16/ 1/ I 2 I I I 1 / 5/11/ 31 I ii 
Mean/ 1. 10 I 1. 90 I. 30 I I. 70 0.90 I 2.10 
11 3 3 2 I 
12 2 I 2 I 2 I 
13 2 I 2 I 2 I 
..... 14 2 1 2 I I 1 I J:I 
..., 15 2 1 2 I I 2 ('1) 
::1. 16 3 3 3 
0 17 2 I 2 I 2 I ... 
(") 18 3 3 3 
::r 19 3 3 3 s; 20 2 1 2 1 2 I 
... 
(I) 
J:I Total 2J I I 11815141 1 / 2 I I I /rn/ 5/ 4/ I 3 1 I I I /151415] I I I 
Mean 0.20 I 2.80 0.20 I 2.80 0.40 I 2.60 
ren: 90 %, 90 %, 80 %, ; inferior children: 80 %, 80 %. 70 % in Section I, 
II and III respectively ; the differences between the two groups are insignifi 
cant). 
It was further noticed that even when the inferior children chose 
comparatively unfit tools such as R and C, they could pass the ball suc-
cessfully through each section all three times with those tools, and make 
a detour, by rolling,scoopingupandgivingajumpingmotion to the ball, as 
skilfully as the superior children with their single or combined use of 
tools. 
In the case of the feeble-minded children, three of them failed to pass 
the ball through Section III. but the other seven handled the ball skilfully 
after their discovery of the detour-path, there being no difference in technique 
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between these children and the other groups. But the more or less con-
spicuous tendency observed among them was that after putting in the stick 
S or T perpendicularly through the bars, they did not make it horizontal 
but tried to push the ball holding the stick perpendicularly, and when 
taking out the stick, they tried to take it out by force without paying no 
attention to the bars, and in Section III they put in the stick at a wrong 
place and tried to bounce up the ball. But in general, we find that the 
superior, inferior and feeble-minded children made no great difference in 
their records as far as the results of Section I-II-III are concerned. 
It is inferred, therefore, that if they had not been required to make 
adjustment to the physical structure of Section IV, the problem would 
have been solved without much difficulty by the children of all the three 
groups. And it follows that in a situation like Sections I-III where they 
make a detour by rolling, scooping and giving a jumping motion to the 
ball, the intellectual cognition and the intellectual activity have no relation 
at all with each other. Now let us see what was their abjustment to 
Section IV. 
3. The use of tools iu Section IV (making of the detoure-Path) and the 
Patterns of solution of the total situation. 
The use of tools by the superior children and inferior children in 
Section IV is shown in Table 2 and Fig. 5, and the comparison of solution-
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TABLE 2 
IV 
-~~~----
------------
-------- ------
Superior Children Inferior Children 
----r··· -------- ---
Success! :;;i Success ? Ss I ::; Ss Too! I E; Tool ~ 
'"I Bf s I ('I) B rs ('I) ,-
l I I I 
l 2 11 2 l 
2 I l 12 3 
3 1 ' 1 l l :, I 3 4 21 1 
I 
14 3 
5 2' l 15 2 1 
6 l I 2 16 3 
7 l I 
31 
2 I 17 3 
8 l I 2 
! 
18 
31 
I 
3 
9 I 
I 
19 
10 i 21 l 20 3 
Total! 10/ 91 11 I Totaij__3 I 4 / 23 
----- ·~----· 
Mean! l. 90 11. 10 1 Mean! 0.70 12. 30 
pattern between the two groups in Table 3. 
These tables and figure show, in the first place that very few of even 
the superior children succeded by using tool S or B, and that "direct solu-
tion by insight" of the problem in such a situation is extremly difficult for 
children of this age. ln the second or third trial, however, superior child-
ren made rapid progress in "solution by insight after error" with any one 
of the tools, while inferior children, on the contrary, made little progress. 
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In other words, between the average numbers of both groups: t=2. 79, 
p =0. 025; between the percentages of solution by insight of total problem: 
X2 =7.14, p=0. 01; namely the difference is found to be significant at each 
level. As for the feeble-minded, all 10 ended in non-solution, including 
those who failed before Section IV. Here are the typical cases of solution-
patterns: 
-~ Group 
--Patterns of ·--"----
Learning __ _ 
gi [ / Direct Solution by Insight 
- oq I 2: g_- Solution by Insight 
§ S after Errors 
Non-Solution 
a) Direct solution by insight. 
Subject No. 9; 
TABLE 3 
Superior children 
2 
8 
() 
Inferior Children 
2 
7 
Looking into the box here and there for some time, he murmured, 
"It '11 fall, I'm sure". Suddenly he said "I'll get it by covering there (i) 
with this stick (S)", with a smile-Im. 20 s. passed-and using both 
S and R he made a detour round c, further rolled the ball from (b) toward 
(d), and after scooping up toe he pressed it with R and, taking out S at the 
same time, put it into Section IV; next he took up T and pressed the ball 
with it and took out R, and holding perpendicularly, succeeded in buncing 
up the ball to (g). The whole process took Im. 40 s. In his second trial 
likewise, he showed a smooth and appropriate behavior process with his 
handlings in each section directed toward the total purpose, and in the 
third it took him only 20 seconds 1.o solve the problem. 
b) Solution by insight after error. 
Subject No. 7: 
First trial: He first gave a few pushes to the ball in Section I with B 
and made a detour round (c). After that he perhaps found it difficult to use 
B in that way, and passed the ball through Section II and III with S. But 
he failed, because he did not cover the hole. In the second trial too he 
let fall the ball in Section IV (see Fig. 6), though he had made some 
progress in handling S. Soon after that, however, this subject, who had 
been watching the ball returning to its original place (a) cried "Oh, I see". 
He gave a hasty glance at the tools one after another, and the next time 
he tried, he stopped the hole with B and solved the problem by moving the 
ball with S (see Fig. 7). 
Most of the inferior and feeble-minded children were apt to ascribe their 
failure to their handling in Section I-III. A moron child, for instance, in 
his third trial went on bouncing the ball with R and S alternatively in Sec-
tion III and murmured many times "Wait, it (ball) will fall over there (i)" on 
his way, but knew not how to handle against the hole, and, perhaps 
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wanting to prevent the ball from falling down, he pushed B through the 
bars at (a) as far as (f) to block the path in Section III, and there he was 
seen bouncing the ball many times. Finding that this served only to make 
the ball return to (e), he took out B again, bounced the ball, and left it 
fall as in his first and second trials. 
Fig. 6 Fig 7 
With superior children, on the contrary, their failure made them survey 
the physical, causal relations of Section IV and the use of tools against 
the hole. The hypothesis built up there r esulted in changing the cognitive 
structure of the total situation. In this case, the hole, which had so far 
been a part of a differ ent whole playing no special role in the detour-path, 
seemed to be brought by the falling move ment into close relation with the 
detour and united into a new whole. 
Such a solution-pattern is different to some degree from what is called 
"foresight" as in cases where the subject can solve appropriately from the 
first beginning or "hindsight" after solution by trial and error, but it is a 
pattern of activity by insight which may be called, so to speak, a sort of 
"bysight" . It may also be said a concrete process of the "structual 
shifting (Umstrukturierung) of the field of thinking" (l, 4, 6 , 7, 20, 12). Conse-
quently, it was found that in Section IV superior children adjusted much 
b etter than the other two groups, thus showing much better results in the 
solution of the whole proble m including Section IV. 
It may be concluded from this fact that in a situation where prelimi-
nary cognition before handling inevitably determines success or failure, 
the intellectual cognition e xercises a positive, functional effect on the 
intellectual activity. 
ln future we must inquire into the the d evelopmental limit of the 
relationships between these two inte lligence functions . 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this experiment was to inquire the relations between 
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the intellectual cognition or the logical intelligence and the intelliectual 
activity or the practical intelligence of the children. 
We put to test ten superior children and ten inferior ones in the 6th 
grade of the primary school and ten feeble-minded children for a supple-
mentary experiment. 
These children were told to lead a ball out of a detour-box with tools. 
The principal resulte were as follows : 
In the detour-handling of rolling, scooping up, giving a jumping motion 
to the ball, there could be found no difference in the results of the three 
groups. In such a case, hence, the intellectual cognition and the intel-
lectual activity have no relation to each other. 
However, in a situation in which preliminary cognition before hand-
ling inevitably determines the success or failure of the technical activity, 
such as th case in which one fails to let the ball pass a place unless one 
has stopped a hole beforehand with some tool, the superior children showed 
a more excellent adaptation than the other groups. This result led us to 
conclude that the intellectual cognition positivly and functionally affect 
the intellectual activity in such a situation. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Le but de l'expérimentation est d'éclaircir les rapports existant entre 
la cognition intellectuelle ou l'intelligence logique et l'activité intellectuelle 
ou l'intelligence pratique des enfants, et en même temps d'observer 1 
processus dynamique de la solution par la perspective. Nou avons pris, 
comme sujets, dix enfants supérieurs (âge chronologique 11 ; 9--12; 6, 
quotient d'inteillgence 119-136) et dix enfants inférieurs (âge chonologique 
11;7-12;5, quotient d'intelligence 72-98) de la sixième année de l'école primaire 
et comme expérimentation auxilière, dix enfants à l'esprit faible (anglais 
moron et imbécile, âge chronologique 10; 2-14; 3, quotient d'intelligence 
41-66). 
Nous avons demandé à ces enfants de faire sortir une Balle hors de la 
boête à détours en employant un des cinq instruments. 
Voici les résulatats principaux de l'expérimentation. 
La compréhension de la structure visuelle de la situation de détour 
(découverte des passages détournés) a été facile pour les enfants supérieurs 
et les enfants inférieurs, mais elle a étéassez difficile pour les enfants à 
l'esprit faible. Nous avons compris le processus ici observé de la réac-
tion habituelle à la découverte du passage détourné comme "un change-
ment dynamique du relief de la figure et du fond" dans le champs 
intellectuel. 
Quand les enfants détournent la balle en la roulant, ou en la ramas-
sant, en la faisant sauter (cas analogue à celui de H. Bogen), il n'y a 
pas eu beaucoup de différence de résultats entre les trois groupes d'enfants. 
Nous avons appris en conséquence, qu'il n'y avait dans cette sorte de cas 
aucune liaison entre la cognition intellectuelle et l'activité intellectuelle. 
Pourtant, dans le cas (cas au caractère anaglogue à celui de K. 
Gottschaldt) où la cognition avant manipulation détermine inévitablement 
le succès ou l'insuccès de l'activité, par exemple, dans le cas où l'on fait 
passer la balle au-dessus d'un trou qu'il s'agit de fermer avec un instru-
ment, les enfants supérieurs se sont beaucoup mieux adaptés que ceux des 
autres groupes. 
Nous avons conclu que dans un pareil cas la cognition intellectuelle 
agit positivement et fonctionnellement sur l'activité intellectuelle. 
"La solution directe par la perspective" de tout le problème s'est vue 
très peu remarqueable même chez les enfants supérieurs mais dans "la 
solution par la perspective après erreur" ils ont donnè un résultat bien 
meilleur que les deux autres groupes, 
Nous nous sommes expliqué ce faits comme un processus concret de 
"la réorganisation de la situation totale." 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In dieser Untersuchung haben wir versucht die Beziehung zwischen 
dem intelligenten Erkennen oder der logischen Intelligenz und dem intelli-
genten Handeln oder der praktischen Intelligenz in den Kindern klarzustellen 
und daneben den dynamischen Vorgang der einsichtigen Lösung zu betrach-
ten. 
In dem Hauptexperiment dienten als Vpn. 10 vortreffliche Kinder (L. A. :11; 
9-12;6, IQ : 119-136) 10 minderwertigere Kinder (L. A. : 11:7-12:5, IQ: 72-98), 
alle Schüler des 6 Schuljahres in einer Volksschule,und in dem Ergänzungsex-
periment 10 schwachsinnige Kinder (Debile und Imbezille, L. A. : 10:2-14: 3, 
IQ: 41-66). 
Die Aufgabe war eine Kugel mittels irgend eines der fünf Werkzeuge 
aus der Umweg-Kiste hinauszuführen, 
Die hauptsächlichen Ergebnisse sind : 
1) Die Auffassung der visuellen Struktur der Umweg-Situation, d. h. 
Entdeckung des Umwegs ist leicht für die vortrefflichen wie die minder-
wertigeren, aber es ist ziemlich schwer für die schwachsinnigen. Wir 
betrachten den Vorgang dieser Entdeckung als die dynamische Veränderung 
des Dankfeldes, d. h. die neu hervortauchende Struktur der Figur und des 
Grundes. 
2) Es gibt keinen merkwürdigen Unterschied zwischen den drei Gruppen, 
wenn sie die Kugel durch stossendes Walzen, Aufschhöpfen und Aufschnel-
len den Umweg machen lassen (Ähnliche Situation wie die des H. Bogens). 
Wir finden also keine Beziehung zwischen dem intelligenten Erkennen und 
dem intelligenten Handeln. 
3) Die vortrefflichen Kinder passen besser an als die anderen Kinder 
dem Fall, wo das vorausgehende Erkennen notwendig Erfolg order Misser-
folg des folgenden Handelns bestimmt, wenn die Vp. zuvor die Höhle auf 
dem Wege mit dem Brett decken muss, so dass die Kugel hemmungslos 
hinüberrolle (ähnlicher Charakter bei der K. Gottschaldt's Situation). In 
solchem Fall bietet das intelligente Erkennen einen Vorteil für das intelli-
gente Handeln. 
4) Die direkte einsichtige Lösung der ganzen Aufgaben kommt selten 
auch in den vortrefflichen Kindern vor. In der einsichtigen Lösung nach 
dem Fehlen beweisen sie aber ganz bessere Leistung als die andere zwei 
Gruppen. Wir erklären also solchen Tatbestand als einen konkreten Vor-
gang der Umstrukturierung der ganzen Situation. 
